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A NEW LOCAL TAX POLICY IN PENNSYLVANIA
As a result of increasing costs, and the demands of the political subdivisions
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for additional income, the General Assembly, during the Session of 1947, enacted a statute designed to enable political subdivisions to raise additional revenues. 1 This legislation was modeled after the
Sterling Act 2 (the act takes its name from its sponsor) which applied only to cities
of the first and second class (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh).
The Act of 1947 authorized the authorities of cities of the second class, cities
of the second class A, cities of the third class, boroughs, towns, townships of the
first class, and school districts of the second, third, and fourth classes to:
'levy, assess and collect or provide for the levying, assessment and collection of such taxes on persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects and personal property within the limits of such political subdivisions,
as it shall determine, except that such local authorities shall not have
authority by virtue of this act to levy, assess and collect * * * any tax on a
privilege, transaction, subject, occupation or personal property which
is now or does hereafter become subject to a State tax or license fee* * *"
Other subject matters exempted from this power to levy taxes were "the gross
receipts from utility service * of a company whose rates and services are fixed
and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission" and "the privilege of
employing such tangible property as is now or does hereafter become subject to a
State tax."
The statute embodies an expressed legislative intention in the following quotation:
"It is the intention of this section to confer upon such political subdivision the power to levy, assess, and collect taxes upon any and all subjects of taxation which the Commonwealth has power to tax but which it
does not now tax or license * * * "

The statute contains a "ceiling", upon the aggregate amount of taxes that can
be levied by any political subdivision by limiting the amount imposed annually to
an amount not in excess of that obtained by multiplying the total assessed valuation
of real estate in such political subdivision by the maximum millage of tax thereon
allowed by law.
The political subdivisions have not been reluctant to avail themselves of this
newly granted power. 27 cities have passed 26 ordinances on amusements, 6 on mechanical devices (juke boxes, vending machines, etc.), 7 mercantile tax ordinances,
6 income wage or payroll taxes, and 4 miscellaneous ones.3 Townships, numbering
10, have passed 2 amusement taxes, 1 taxing mechanical devices, 5 severance taxes
1 Act of June 25,

1947, P. L. 1145 (Act. 481).
Act of August 5, 1932, P. L. 45 of Acts and Vetoes, Special Session of 1932.
3 4 cities have levied taxes on personal property and I on property transactions.
2
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and 3 miscellaneous. 4 64 Boroughs have enacted 33 tax ordinances on amusements,
20 on mechanical devices, 2 mercantile taxes, 11 income, wage or payroll taxes, 18
'per capita taxes, I severance tax, and 6 miscellaneous. 5 55 school districts have
passed 6 resolutions taxing amusements, 1 on mechanical devices, 16 on income,
wages or payrolls, 2 per capita taxes, 31 severance taxes, and two miscellaneous. 1
No complete compilation has been made of the ordinances and resolutions adopted
and proposed but 94 have adopted or proposed some type of tax on the coal industry
alone.8
Some of the tax ordinances and resolutions are startling when their impact on
business or on individuals is considered. Double taxation of coal is not uncommon,
the same coal being taxed by one political subdivision where it is produced, by another where it is processed or prepared for market, or by still another, where it is
hauled or dumped into railroad cars. The same is true of taxes imposed by political
subdivisions on personal property already taxed by counties. Other ordinances and
resolutions can only be reconciled with a desire upon the part of political subdivisions to suppress certain businesses as shown by the following examples: 35 cents
a ton on strip-mined coal, 25 cents a ton on the deposit of waste material, $150 annually on each pin ball machine, $40 a month on used car dealers and $300 a week
on carnivals.
The Sterling Acts mentioned before, although used as a model for the present
legislation differs materially from it, in that the Sterling Act contained no provision
exempting gross receipts of utility services, no prohibition against taxing the privilege of employing tangible property now taxed by the State, nor the "ceiling"
measured by the real estate tax. That Act, however, contained the same prohibition
against taxing the same subject matters as were taxed by the State.
Under the authority of the Sterling Act, the City of Pittsburgh passed an ordinance taxing certain companies and individuals "in respect to the ownership 6r use"
of meters. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Pittsburgh' o held this ordinance imposed a property tax and as this property was taxed
by the State under the Capital Stock Tax,' the city was expressly prohibited from
taxing it under the Sterling Act.
Two important cases, arising under tax ordinances passed by the City of Philadelphia, received appellate review. In 1938, City Council passed a sales tax and in
Blauner's, Inc. et a! v. Philadelphiaet d12, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania de4 3 townships have levied taxes on real estate conveyances.
5 These miscellaneous ordinances are on signs.billboards, sale of scrap metal, coal stored, gas
pumps and tanks, and $3.00 per person employed by any person or corporation.
6 These misrelleneous resolutions taxed "bone" coal dumped, taxed the ownership of realty, and
on rents paid by tenants.
7 This data was compiled by the Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
8 Compilation made by Western Pennsylvania Coal Operators Assn.
9 Act of August 5, 1932, P. L. 45 of Acts and Vetoes, Special Session of 1932.
10 317 Pa. 1 (1934).
11 Act of April 25, 1929, P. L. 637.,
12 330 Pa. 340 (1938).
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cided that the delegation of tax power conferred on the City of Philadelphia was
a lawful delegation, because it was expressly sanctioned by the Constitution of Pennsylvania in Section 1 of Article 15 (the home rule amendment), which reads in part:
"Cities, or cities of any paiticular class, may be given the right and power to frame and adopt their own charters and to exercise the powers and
authority of local self-government, subject, however, to such restrictions,
limitations and regulations, as may be imposed by the Legislature."
The Court then went on to say that the sales tax ordinance was valid because
the State had not, by taxation, invaded this field, hence it did not violate the prohibition contained in the Sterling Act.
It is interesting to note that in this case the appellant did not raise the question
whether the Sterling Act was too broad a delegation of power by the Legislature of
its taxing power in that it violated Article 9, Section 1 of the Constituteon.
"All taxes shall be uniform upon the name class of subjects, within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected under general laws * *
The second case, that came before the Supreme Court, Philadelphia v. Samuels,13 arose out of another tax ordinance passed by the City of Philadelphia imposing a tax, measured by a percentage of the gross receipts derived from the charges
of parking automobiles in an operi parking lot. Appeals in these cases were taken
by an individual and a corporation and were argued together. The Court held the
ordinance to be valid and enforceable against both the individual and corporate
appellant, as these "transactions" were not taxed by the State.
Under the authority of the 1947 legislation, the School District of Robinson
Township, in the County of Allegheny, passed a resolution taxing "all coal mined
and or removed from the ground in Robinson Township" at the rate of 5 cents a ton.
A partnership, a taxpayer under the resolution, petitioned the Supreme Court to
take original jurisdiction. The petition was granted. The constitutionality of the Act
of Assembly was attacked on two main fronts. First, can the Legislature, in the
face of Article 9, Section 1 of the Constitution, delegate to political subdivisions,
other than cities (which have home rule powers), the power to impose taxes through
their own ordinances or resolutions, on any thing or person if such are not subject to
State taxation or license fees? And secondly, that the Act produced special and local
results. The Supreme Court, in its decision in this case, English et al v. School District of Robinson Township,' 4 held that the Act was constitutional saying that the
question had been decided, as to cities, by the opinion in Blauner's Inc. et al v. Philadelphia et al (cited before), and that, as it applied to school districts (the issue
before the court), there existed no unlawful delegation of power. The Court pointed
to the existence of the "ceiling" as limiting the school district's taxing power. The
Court also held that the statute did not violate Article 9, Section 1 of the Constitution as the taxing resolution was effective throughout the territorial limits of the
13 338 Pa. 321 (1940).
14 358 Pa. 45 (1948).

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

school district, and the enabling act was general throughout the State. The Court
then reasoned from this conclusion that it was not special or local legislation.
It is submitted that although the Supreme Court held that the statute under discussion was general, it did not say it was a general law under which taxes could be
levied and collected; nor did the Court say that the'resolution, under which the taxe:4
were levied ahd collected, was a general law. No taxes can be levied and collected
under the statute; they must be levied and collected under an ordinance or resolution.
The political subdivision determines, whether it shall levy or not levy a tax, what
things or persons shall be taxed, the rate of tax, the penalties for noni-compliancc
with the provisions of the ordinance or resolution, and how, when or where the tax
will be collected. Does this satisfy the second part of Article 9, Section 1 of the Constitution?
As the Supreme Court based its decision in the English Case principally upon
the existence of a maximum "ceiling", the practical application of this limitation
should be considered. Several school districts have given notice of intention to
impose taxes, "tile collection of the tax to continue during the year or until the maximum amount allowed by the Act of June 25, 1947, P. L. 1145 has been reached.' '. 6
In the absence of accurate estimating of the future yield of newly enacted levies, if
the maximum amount is reached, does this mean that the taxpayers who have made
prompt payment are to be discriminated against in favor of the delinquent ones?
Even if such a maximum is reached, the political subdivision could, in the next year,
increase the real estate millage under the authority of the statute and hence be safely
under the "ceiling" and automatically avoid the limitation imposed by the General
Assembly.1"
Following the decision in English v. Robinson Township School District an
important case arose in Clearfield County involving a school district tax of 5 cents
per ton on coal mined in Lawrence Township. 17 In that appeal the issue on the
constitutional question was squarely based on the tax resolution and not on the Act of
1947. The contention was advanced that no tax whatever could be levied and collected under the statute; that the Constitution 1 8 required all taxes to be levied and collected under general laws; and that art ordinance or resolution, applicable only in one
political subdivision, was not a general law. This question was not answered in the
decision of the Court. Instead the tax was upheld in view of the decision in English
v. School District of Robinson Township upholding the statute.
While the word "law" in Section 1 of Article 9 of the Constitution has not been
defined, the meaning of the word in other sections of the Constitution has always
16 Clay Township School District, Butler Co. and Centre Township School District, Blair Co.
16 Section 6 of the Act of June 25, 1947, P. L. 1145.
17 Appeal from Resolution of Lawrence Township School District, Quarter Sessions, No. 30,
December SS 1947.
18 Section 1, Article 9.
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been defined as meaning a law enacted by the Legislature and not a municipal
ordinance. 9
It also seems perfectly clear that the words "general law" were employed in
this section of the Constitution to assure that the Legislature was prohibited from
passing local tax laws, a prohibition already contained in Section 7, Article 3 of the
Constitution. The word "under" which precedes the words "general law" is undoubtedly a preposition meaning "in conformity with", "by virtue of" or "as controlled or governed by."
The "ceiling" pointed to by the Supreme Court does not concern either the levy
or collection of the tax; it concerns the total amount of revenue which can be raised.
The two other contentions, raised in the Lawrence Township case, should also
be noted. The first of these was that the resolution, which imposed a tax on coal
mined in Lawrence Township, imposed a tax on the property of corporations subject
to the State Capital Stock Tax; and if the school district tax was construed to be
a privilege tax on the right to mine coal, the tax was still prohibited because the Act
denied the power to tax the privilege of employing such tangible property as was
taxed by the State. The school district actually contended the tax was an excise on the
privilege of mining.
The clause in the Act denying the right to tax the privilege of employing tangible property taxed by the State is as follows: 20
"nor have authority, except on sales 0 ' ' or other transfers of title or
possession of property, to levy, assess or collect a tax on the privilege of
employing such tangible property as is new or docs hereafter become subject to a state tax"
In order to uphold the tax the Court said "the coal operators' chief b, isiness is the severance of the coal from the
ground and the sale of it after it has been transported to its destination
* * We believe this resolution to amount to a sales tax of five cents on
each and every ton of coal mined and removed in Lawrence Township."
There is not the slightest evidence in the tax resolution of any intent to impose
a sales tax on a transaction involving transfers of title or possession of property.
And it is difficult to follow the reasoning of the Court that a sales tax can be levied
on coal merely because it is mined in a given township, particularly where the sale,
as the Court indicates, is made after the coal has been transported to its destination
which invariably would be beyond the limits of the township.
The second contention in the Lawrence Township case was that the tax imposed
by the school district exceeded the "ceiling" under the Act. It was contended by the
appellants that the maximum millage for general revenue purposes in third class
19 Baldwin v. City of Phila., 99 Pa. 164; Davis v. Homestead Borough, 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 444;
McCormick v, Fayette County, 150 Pa. 190; Taylor v. Phila., 261 Pa. 458; Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa.
326; County of Crawford v. Nash, 99 Pa. 253.
20 Section 1 of the Act of June 25, 1947, P. L. 1145.
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school districts was 25 under Section 537 of the School Code." By an amendment
to the School Code, made at the time minimum salaries for teachers were provided
for, third class school districts were given power to levy annually a tax sufficient to
pay the minimum salaries and increments of the teaching and supervisory staff.2 2
It was contended that the maximum millage limitation referred to in the statute
was the limitation for general revenue purposes and that special or unlimited 23
millages were not to be taken into consideration. The levy for minimum salaries of
teachers, etc., seems to be a special levy and is unlimited, except by decisional law
which has held that while the levy for this purpose may be above the general 25
mill limit credit must first be given for the amount contributed by the State towards
24
teachers' salaries.
The Court said the following on this point:
"So far as we have been able to discover, there is no maximum for districts of the third class. Lawrence Township is a school district of the third
class. There is no testimony as to the maximum millage which such district
may be permitted to levy. Inquiry by the court, of people who should have
special knowledge, would indicate that as to third class districts there is no
maximum levy, and we have been told by school authorities that there is no
maximum levy for districts of the third class.
"Ifthere is a limitation beyond which third class districts may not exceed
in levying taxes for school purposes, then there is a maximum fixed in act
481 of 1947, limiting the extent to which they can levy a tax under that
act. If there is a maximum, then act 481 is a general law. As to third class
school districts, the effect of act 481 may go much further than contemplated by either the legislature in the passage of the act, or by the
Supreme Court in the decision in the Robinson Case. Undoubtedly,
thc Supreme Court had in mind that there is a sufficient limitation. In view of the decision in the case of English v. School
District of Robinson Township supra, that the act is constitutional,
and not a delegation of the taxing power, and though there is a limit beyond which the school district can not go, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, we must accept the ruling of the Supreme Court of our state, and
will overrule the remaining two objections by the appellants."
It is difficult to come to any conclusion from the above language other than
that the Court believed there was no limitation on the millage which a third class
school district could levy although the Court says there was no testimony as to the
maximum millage. Whether there is or is not a maximum millage for third class
school districts is not a matter of fact but of law which it is the duty of the Court
to determine.
The testimony in the case clearly established that the tax imposed by the school
district on the coal production in Lawrence Township, which was stipulated on the
21 May 18, 1911, P. L. 309.
22 Apr. 21, 1921, P. L. 321, sec. 1210 Cl. 24.
28 As an illustration the levy for debt service under section
24 Duff v. Perry Twp. School Dist., 281 Pa. 87. (1924).

1301 of the Borough Code of 1947.
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record, would materially exceed, for the period from the effective date of the tax
resolution to the end of the fiscal year or for the fiscal year if calculated on an annual basis, the amount which could be raised by a 25 mill levy on the valuation of
the real estate in the township.
The decision of the Court on this point seems to be that, even though there is
no maximum limit on the millage in third class school districts, since the Supreme
Court pointed to the ceiling provision as saving the Act, the Court below could not
hold the Act unconstitutional.
In conclusion, it would appear that this policy of local taxation should be reexamined, not only as to its economic impacts, but also as to its other resultant effects, not the least being that upon the constitutional guide posts that have piloted
the Commonwealth so successfuly in the past.
RAYMOND

E.

EVLETH

